Seminar: Roadmap to Secure Power Control Systems against Cyber-Intrusions

TOPIC Roadmap to Secure Power Control Systems against Cyber-Intrusions
SPEAKER Chee-Wooi Ten, Assistant Professor
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Michigan Technological University, Houghton, MI, USA
DATE 23 November 2009 (Monday)
TIME 4.00 pm to 5.30 pm
VENUE EA-06-02, Engineering block EA, NUS
FEES No Charge

ABSTRACT
With today's technological advance in communication devices and sensors, interdependencies between energy and computer communication infrastructures have evolved into more complex systems that changes the way how it operates. Integration of these infrastructures has become one of the important components to smart grid vision as it facilitates better infrastructure management of existing physical infrastructure with renewable resources. The approach not only does improve system operations, but also it serves as a control backbone at a system-level to ensure security and integrity. As the revolutionary shift has moved toward an automated paradigm, managing the power system operations through cyber-infrastructure can undoubtedly improve the efficiency of energy delivery. However, the drawback of this revolution, by introducing the standardized communication protocols, can also increase the risks of cyber-threats, i.e., electronic intrusions to local or system level to manipulate the control variables for a cyber-attack. In order to prevent such catastrophic disruption on power operations, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) has attempted to establish procedures and policies by mandating the cybersecurity compliances to utility companies. In recent years, the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) has also been engaging in responding to the challenging issues, such as encryptions on the existing communication channels and establishing system-wide network anomaly and detection prototypes. Besides all these policies and cyber-network management improvements, there has been minimal synergic efforts to collaborate research between multidisciplinary areas that emphasizes the anomaly event extraction and possible resulting impact of cyber-attacks on supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. This talk introduces 4 major components of comprehensive cybersecurity framework that include (i) Real-time monitoring, (ii) Anomaly detection, (iii) Impact analysis, and (iv) Mitigation strategies (RAIM). The framework addresses systematic vulnerability evaluation of SCADA systems at three levels: system, scenarios, and access points. The proposed method is based on cyber systems embedded with the firewall and password models. The impact of a potential electronic intrusion is evaluated by its potential loss of load in the power system. An extended model to coordinated attacks has been developed for the control center and substation networks based on the anomaly correlation methods. The impact studies of the coordinated attacks demonstrate that the feasibility of systematic evaluations that can be furthered improved. One way to further articulate the practical needs is the software implementation of future control center framework for the use of on-line decision support aids in operational environment.
BIOGRAPHY
Chee-Wooi Ten was born in Alor Setar, Malaysia. He received the BSEE and MSEE degrees from Iowa State University, Ames, in 1999 and 2001, respectively. Prior to completing his Master's degree, he had a summer internship with MidAmerican in Des Moines working as an Energy Management System (EMS) Analyst. He was an Application Engineer with Siemens Energy Management and Information System (SEMIS) in Singapore from 2002 to 2006. He has recently received the PhD degree from University College Dublin (UCD), National University of Ireland. His primary research interests are (1) cybersecurity of power system infrastructure and alternative-energy resource management and (2) software prototype and power automation applications on SCADA systems. He is currently an Assistant Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering (ECE) Department at Michigan Technological University.

REMARKS
Light refreshments will be served after the seminar.